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JAMES V ILLINOIS-THE IMPEACHMENT
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: HERE TODAY ...
The exclusionary rule precludes the use of evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing where such evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth, fifth, or
sixth amendments to the United States Constitution.' The United States
Supreme Court's application of the exclusionary rule preserves the integrity
of the judicial system by refusing to condone the illegal actions of law en-
forcement officials. 2 For many years the exclusionary rule acted as a com-
plete prohibition against the admission of tainted evidence.3 The Court
1. For purposes of clarity, this Note refers to a single exclusionary rule. There is, how-
ever, a separate, judicially created exclusionary rule coupled with each of these constitutional
guarantees which bars the use of evidence obtained in violation of the specific guarantee.
The fourth amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CO ST. amend. IV. Thus, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule precludes the use of
physical evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure or without probable cause.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914); see also Wasserstrom and Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It
a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85-87 (1984) (discussing exclusionary rule's creation
as protection of fourth amendment privileges).
The fifth amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment
"in and of itself directly and explicitly commands its own exclusionary rule--a defendant can-
not be compelled to give evidence against himself." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443,498 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (state-
ments obtained from a criminal suspect in violation of established procedures will be excluded
from use at trial based on defendant's privilege against self-incrimination).
The sixth amendment provides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Thus, the sixth amendment exclusionary rule prohibits the
use of statements obtained in violation of a criminal suspect's right to counsel. See Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964); see also Note, The Impeachment Exception to the Sixth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 176, 184-91 (1987) (tracing development
of sixth amendment exclusionary rule).
2. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (unlawfully obtained evi-
dence may not be used in any manner) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920)); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (fourth amendment
prohibits use of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal proceeding).
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recognized, however, that defendants were using the exclusionary rule to
their advantage by offering testimony contrary to the suppressed evidence.4
Accordingly, the Court created the impeachment 5 exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.6
The impeachment exception was designed to prevent defendants from
"perverting" the judicial system through the presentation of perjurious testi-
mony in reliance on the prosecutors' inability to admit the suppressed evi-
dence to challenge the defendants' credibility.7 While the impeachment
exception was initially applied to evidence violating the fourth amendment,'
the Court eventually broadened it to encompass evidence obtained in viola-
tion of both the fifth9 and sixth' ° amendments.
4. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
5. Impeachment may be achieved through any combination of the following five tech-
niques: 1) proving the inconsistency of testimony with prior statements; 2) showing the wit-
ness to be emotionally biased (such as kinship for one party); 3) attacking the character of the
witness; 4) showing a defect in the witness' ability to observe, remember, or recount the mat-
ters testified about; and 5) proving through other witnesses that facts are otherwise than as
testified to by the witness. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33 (3d ed. 1984).
Use of the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule is generally impeachment by con-
tradiction. That is, the excluded evidence is admitted and tends to show that the witness either
erred or lied, and the excluded evidence highlights this contradiction. Id. § 47.
6. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (allowing defendant to use the exclu-
sionary rule to his advantage would be "a perversion of the Fourth Amendment"); see infra
notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
There are other exceptions to the exclusionary rule which are beyond the scope of this Note.
For example, the "good faith" exception allows for the admission of evidence seized by police
under the good faith belief of a warrant's validity, despite a subsequent finding that the war-
rant was defective. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984); see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 5, § 177 (3d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987). The Supreme Court has also held the rule to
be inapplicable to grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), and
deportation proceedings, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
The exclusionary rule's boundaries continue to be explored. For example, in 1991, President
George Bush submitted the Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act to Congress and pro-
posed to further extend the good faith exception to warrantless searches and to make the rule
inapplicable to the introduction of unlawfully seized firearms in the prosecution for violent or
drug related offenses. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3192-93 (1991).
7. Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see infra text accompanying notes
43-46.
9. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (impeachment of defendant with other-
wise excluded, self-incriminating statements is proper); see infra notes 87-102 and accompany-
ing text.
10. Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1177-78 (1990) (statements elicited from de-
fendant in violation of sixth amendment right to counsel admissible to impeach defendant's
false or inconsistent testimony).
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Until recently, the Court's decisions concerning impeachment exception
application dealt solely with the defendant's testimony." Specifically, the
Court has addressed whether the impeachment exception should be trig-
gered on direct or cross-examination, 2 and whether the exception should
apply to collateral evidence or evidence bearing directly on the indicted
crime.' 3 In James v. Illinois, " the Court confronted an entirely different
question: Given the boundaries of the impeachment exception, to whom
should it apply?
In James, Chicago police detectives took Darryl James into custody as a
suspect for murder and attempted murder after a confrontation between two
groups of youths resulted in the shooting death of one person and the serious
injury of another. "s The detectives found James sitting under a hair dryer at
his mother's beauty salon, and when he emerged his hair was black and
curly.' 6 Without first obtaining a warrant, the detectives arrested and ques-
tioned James.' 7 In response to the questions, James revealed that his hair
was reddish-brown and straight the day before, and he admitted that he
went to the salon to have his hair " 'dyed black and curled in order to
change his appearance.' vo18
The state indicted James for both murder and attempted murder.' 9 Prior
to trial, the court suppressed James' statements regarding his hair because
11. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (impeachment exception ap-
plied to defendant's testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (same); Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (same).
12. Havens, 446 U.S. at 625 (impeachment exception applies to defendant's testimony
elicited on cross as well as direct examination); see also Note, The Exclusionary Rule: Im-
peachment Exception Broadened to Include Statements First Elicited Upon Cross-Examina-
tion-United States v. Havens, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 225, 236-41 (1980) (criticizing Havens as
a weakening of the exclusionary rule) [hereinafter, Note, The Exclusionary Rule]; Note,
United States v. Havens: Impeachment By Illegally Obtained Evidence, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV.
637, 666-77 (1981) (analyzing Havens' application of the impeachment exception to defend-
ant's cross-examination testimony) [hereinafter Note, Impeachment By Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence]; see also infra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
13. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 (impeachment exception applies to evidence both collaterally
and directly related to the crimes charged); see also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 3, 44-53 (1971) (Harris represents "basic hostility" to impeachment exception limita-
tions); Comment, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder?, 38 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 357, 359-70 (1971) (criticizing Harris as a "'law and order' decision" which
disregards the impeachment exception's previously established limitations); infra text accom-
panying notes 87-108.
14. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
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the statements were the result of a warrantless arrest lacking probable
cause. 20 At trial, five youths involved in the confrontation testified for the
state, each identifying James as the murderer.2 While James did not testify,
he called Jewel Henderson, a family friend, to testify on his behalf.22 Hen-
derson testified that she was with James on the day before the shooting, and
that, at that time, his hair was black.2 3 Over the objection of James' counsel,
the court allowed the state to introduce James' unlawfully obtained state-
ments to impeach Henderson's testimony. 24 James was subsequently con-
victed of both murder and attempted murder.25
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed James' convictions and granted a
new trial, holding that the impeachment exception was created solely to im-
peach a defendant's testimony and is inapplicable to defense witnesses.26
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed and reinstated the convic-
tions, choosing to expand the exception to deter the defendant from engag-
ing in perjury "by proxy."2 7 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that
although the defendant did not testify in his own defense, the trial court was
correct in granting use of the statements for impeachment because the testi-
mony of the witness was purposely presented on direct examination and
clearly contrary to the defendant's prior statements.28 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 9
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, ° the Supreme Court reversed
the Illinois Supreme Court and refused to expand the impeachment excep-
tion to encompass defense witnesses."a The Court focused its reasoning on
20. Id. at 309-10
21. Id. at 310. There was some discrepancy between the testimony of these witnesses and
their in-court identifications. Each testified that the shooter had " 'reddish'" hair, while at




24. Id. The trial court, however, did not limit the state in its introduction of the state-
ment. The state went beyond impeaching Jewel Henderson's testimony about James' hair
color and added the statement that he did so to "change his appearance." Id.
25. Id
26. People v. James, 153 Il1. App. 3d 131, 136, 505 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (1987), rev'd, 123
Ill. 2d 523, 528 N.E.2d 723 (1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). The Illinois Appellate Court
reasoned that impeachment of the witness served as substantive use of the excluded evidence
and, therefore, was improper. Id.
27. People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 536, 541, 528 N.E.2d 723, 729, 731 (1988), rev'd, 493
U.S. 307 (1990).
28. Id at 538-39, 528 N.E.2d at 730.
29. 489 U.S. 1010 (1989).
30. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 308 (1990).
31. Id at 320.
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two competing values: the search for truth in criminal proceedings and the
deterrence of police misconduct.3 2 The Court concluded that expansion of
the impeachment exception to defense witnesses would discourage defend-
ants from presenting witnesses who might open the door to otherwise sup-
pressed evidence.33 Moreover, the Court reasoned that expanding the
impeachment exception would not deter police misconduct and could actu-
ally lead to its increase.3 4 Accordingly, while recognizing that defendants
often use the exclusionary rule as a shield, the Court refused to permit the
state to "brandish [the impeachment exception] as a sword."3"
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy3 6 criticized the majority for failing to con-
sider the consequences of its decision.3" He pointed out that failure to ex-
pand the exception would mislead jurors and deprive them of the
opportunity to consider a witness' credibility.38 Justice Kennedy rejected
the argument that defendants will be prejudicially limited in their ability to
present witnesses,39 and found the majority's opinion inconsistent with prior
Court holdings." Further, Justice Kennedy accepted the Illinois Supreme
Court's perjury "by proxy" premise and found defense witnesses no less de-
serving of impeachment than the defendant.4 Justice Stevens filed a concur-
ring opinion in response to the dissent's criticism, pointing out that the
threat of prosecution for perjury is a "'hard reality' " which will deter per-
jury "by proxy."42
This Note first examines the development of the exclusionary rule and the
creation and application of the impeachment exception to the rule. Next,
this Note reviews James v. Illinois and discusses the ramifications of the de-
cision. Finally, this Note concludes that the Court's failure to adopt a lim-
ited expansion of the impeachment exception to encompass defense
witnesses places it in the position of advocating the introduction of false and
misleading testimony, a result the impeachment exception was created to
prevent. Further, the Court discloses a weakness in the existing impeach-
ment exception, allowing for manipulation of the judicial system.
32. Id. at 312-13.
33. Id. at 314-15.
34. Id. at 317-19.
35. Id. at 317.
36. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia. Id. at 322 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id at 324-25.
39. Id. at 328-29.
40. Id. at 322.
41. Id. at 330.
42. Id. at 320-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting id at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Rationale: Judicial Integrity and Deterrence of Police Misconduct
The exclusionary rule was first developed in Weeks v. United States.43 In
Weeks, police officers conducted a warrantless search of Weeks' home, seiz-
ing papers that subsequently were used as evidence to convict Weeks of us-
ing the mails to operate a lottery. ' The United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the fourth amendment prohibits the
use of illegally obtained evidence in federal criminal proceedings.4" The
Court stated that however "praiseworthy" the efforts of the courts are in
administering punishment to the guilty, these efforts cannot "be aided by the
sacrifice of [constitutional] principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land." 46 Expansion of the exclusionary rule continued with applications
developed to encompass the rights afforded under the fifth4 7 and sixth48
amendments.
43. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
44. Id. at 386.
45. Id. at 398. The Supreme Court later expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule to
include state prosecutions via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 657 (1961). In Mapp, a police raid of the defendant's home resulted
in the seizure of pornographic material. Id. at 644-45. While the raid allegedly was supported
by a search warrant based on other suspected crimes, no warrant was produced at trial. Id. at
645. Nevertheless, the defendant ultimately was convicted of possession of the pornographic
material. Id. at 643. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding it based on evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and
seizure. Id. The Court questioned that as it "has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against
the States as it does against the Federal Government the rights of free speech and of a free
press .... [w]hy should not the same rule apply to ... unconstitutional seizure[s] of goods,
papers, effects, documents, etc.?" Id. at 656 (citation omitted). The Court answered that
"holding that the exclusionary rule [as] an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense."
Id. at 657; see Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 319-
43 (discussing Mapp and the ramifications of the Court's extension of the exclusionary rule to
the states).
46. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); see United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51, 54 (1951) (narcotics seized during an unlawful search must be suppressed from eviden-
tiary use at trial based on mandate of fourth amendment); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (prosecution may not "flout" constitutional safeguards against unreason-
able search and seizure through admission of unlawfully obtained evidence).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (statements obtained from a criminal
suspect in violation of established procedures will be excluded from use at trial based on the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 485-87 (1981) (reaffirming Miranda).
48. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (statements obtained from a criminal
suspect deprived of sixth amendment guarantee of counsel are inadmissible at trial).
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Justification for the exclusionary rule is twofold. First, as articulated in
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,49 the rule acts to en-
sure the integrity of the judicial system."0 Justice Brandeis reasoned that
admitting tainted evidence effectively would condone the actions of law en-
forcement officials who themselves violated the law."1 Second, the rule acts
as a deterrent to future police misconduct by commanding respect for consti-
tutional guarantees.52 Yet, while the exclusionary rule may operate to pro-
49. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
50. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
51. Id. Justice Brandeis stated:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If
the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face.
Id. A majority of the Court later adopted this view as a rationale for the exclusionary rule.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80 (approving Justice Brandeis' articulation of the judicial integrity
rationale); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) (same); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659
(1961) (same); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) (same); see also McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) ("flagrant disregard of ... procedure ... [makes] the
courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of [the] law"); LaFave, Improving Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Prac-
tices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 392-93 (1965) (discussing judicial integrity rationale); Comment,
Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusion-
ary Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV. 1129 (1973) (tracing development of the exclusionary rule's judi-
cial integrity rationale).
52. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (the exclusionary rule "is needed to
deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections"); Terry, 392 U.S. at 12
(the main "thrust" of the exclusionary rule is deterrence (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 629-35 (1965)) and without it, the fourth amendment would be a "mere 'form of words'"
(quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655)); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217);
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (the exclusionary rule "compel[s] respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it") (citing
Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 513, 141 A.2d 46, 50, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958)). But
see Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416-17
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule's sanction is visited upon prosecutor, not
the law enforcement official, and rarely will officers be punished for their actions); Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) ("[t]here is no reliable evidence [showing] that inhabitants
of those states which exclude [unlawfully obtained] evidence suffer less from lawless searches
and seizures than those of states that admit it"); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184(a), at 52
n.44 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule is not a significant deter-
rent to police misconduct); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 12
(1964) (it is "wishful thinking" to believe that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on
police); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
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mote these values,53 the rule is not an absolute bar to the use of illegally
obtained evidence.
B. Carving the Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
1. Agnello v. United States
After Weeks, the harsh reality of excluding truthful, incriminating facts
became apparent. By applying the exclusionary rule, and thus refusing to
admit tainted evidence, those guilty of crimes were acquitted simply due to
police error.5 4 Shortly after the exclusionary rule was created in Weeks,
Agnello v. United States5 presented the Court with the opportunity to create
an impeachment exception to the rule. In Agnello, Agnello was charged
with selling narcotics 6 after the government unlawfully seized cocaine from
him." At trial, Agnello did not mention the cocaine on direct examination,
but on cross-examination he testified that he had never seen narcotics. 58
Agnello was convicted after the court allowed the government to introduce
the illegally obtained cocaine during rebuttal to impeach his testimony.59
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that because Agnello
made no mention of the cocaine during direct examination, no justification
678-709, 755 (1970) (offering empirical data to demonstrate exclusionary rule's failure to deter
police misconduct, and advocating abolition of the exclusionary rule).
53. Since the rule's creation, the Court has recognized that the underlying policies of the
exclusionary rule are not absolute and that these policies "must be evaluated in light of com-
peting policies." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976). For example, "the public interest
in determination of truth at trial [may] outweigh the incremental contribution" of the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. (footnote omitted); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (" 'un-
bending application of the exclusionary sanction... would impede unacceptably the truth-
finding functions of judge and jury' ") (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734
(1980)); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (exclusion of unlawfully obtained
evidence must have sufficient likelihood of deterrence to outweigh the societal costs incurred).
54. As illustrated by the terse comment of Justice Cardozo, then serving as a New York
Court of Appeals judge, the rule permits "[t]he criminal ... to go free because the constable
has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (scrutinizing Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926); see
also Stone, 428 U.S. at 490 ("Application of the rule.., deflects the truthfinding process and
often frees the guilty."); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U.
PA. L. REV. 378, 389 (1964) (acknowledging Justice Cardozo's conclusion and commenting
that "pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous
harm on the public interest"); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?,
50 TEX. L. REV. 736, 737 (1972) ("the Exclusionary Rule in its direct application benefits only
the guilty").
55. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
56. Id. at 28.
57. Id. at 29.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 30.
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existed for allowing the introduction of the evidence during cross-examina-
tion."° The Court concluded that because Agnello did not waive his consti-
tutional protection, the exclusionary rule remained in effect and, therefore,
impeachment was improper.61 Thus, while presented with an opportunity to
create an impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court de-
clined to do so. 62 Instead, the Court's refusal to permit the use of tainted
evidence in any manner implicitly reinforced the exclusionary rule.63 De-
spite this holding, however, the Court eventually did create an impeachment
exception in Walder v. United States."
2. Walder v. United States: The Exclusionary Rule is Not a Shield
In Walder v. United States,65 Walder was indicted on federal narcotics
charges after the government unlawfully seized heroin from his home.
66
Although the indictment was dismissed, Walder was brought to trial on un-
related narcotics violations two years later.67 During both direct and cross-
examination, Walder emphatically denied having sold or possessed narcotics
at any time during his life.68 The trial court allowed the government to use
the evidence unlawfully seized two years earlier to impeach Walder's testi-
mony, and he was convicted.69 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
giving the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule its first footing.70
While maintaining the application of the exclusionary rule as a prohibition
against the government's use of unlawfully obtained evidence, the Court re-
fused to allow the defendant to invoke the exclusionary rule as a "shield" to
protect his own perjured testimony; such an expansive view of the exclusion-
ary rule would constitute "a perversion of the Fourth Amendment." 7 ' The
Court reasoned that Walder's voluntary testimony surrounding his involve-
ment with drugs "opened the door" to the excluded evidence, and impeach-
60. Id. at 35.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id (" 'The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall
not be used at all.' ") (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920)).
64. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 62-69.
67. Id. at 63.
68. Id. at 63-64.
69. Id. at 64.
70. Id at 66.
71. Id at 65.
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ment with the tainted evidence was proper. 2 Thus, while acknowledging
the many constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, the Court
refused to protect the submission of perjured testimony.7 a
Commentators initially considered application of the Walder impeach-
ment exception to be limited by three factors.7 4 First, the sole purpose of the
admission of tainted evidence must have been for impeachment. 75 This re-
quirement limited the use of otherwise excluded evidence to those instances
where the defendant "opened the door" to the evidence."' Second, the evi-
dence must have been related to testimony elicited on direct examination of
the defendant.77 This requirement served to reinforce Agnello's holding that
the prosecutor had no justification for utilizing excluded evidence when a
defendant had not voluntarily attempted to refute the excluded evidence.7
It also reflected the Court's intention to frustrate a defendant's attempt to
use the exclusionary rule as a shield.7 ' Finally, the subject of the evidence
must have been collateral" to the charges brought against the defendant.8"
72. Id. at 64. The Court easily distinguished its prior holding in Agnello by explaining
that there, "the Government, after having failed in its efforts to introduce the tainted evidence
in its case in chief, tried to smuggle it in on cross-examination." Id. at 66. In Walder, how-
ever, the Court intimated that the defendant's emphatic denials on direct examination were an
affront to the judicial system and warranted challenge by the prosecutor. See id. at 65.
73. Id. The Walder Court stated:
[T]he Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusa-
tion against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evi-
dence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond
that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively re-
sort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge
his credibility.
Id. at 65. For an insightful analysis to the Court's reasoning in Agnello and Walder, see Der-
showitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1211-17 (1971) (arguing that Walder was a
"rather special exception" to the Court's unanimous rule in Agnello, an exception not to be so
easily expanded).
74. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 178; W. LAFAVE & I. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 9.6 (1985); see also Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rules, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 939, 941-47 (1967) (discussing Walder's apparent limitations to the
impeachment exception).
75. Walder, 347 U.S. at 64-65.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 64-66.
78. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925).
79. Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
80. Collateral facts are those that "are outside the controversy, or are not directly con-
nected with the principal matter or issue." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1990).
See Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (recognizing Walder as
establishing collateral limitation and refusing to apply impeachment exception to matters re-
lated directly to the crimes charged); see also Note, State v. Durepo: Toward a Principled
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The collateral requirement reinforced the exception's design to be used
solely for impeachment purposes.82 If testimony sought to be impeached
was related directly to the crimes charged, admission of the excluded evi-
dence would serve not only an impeachment function, but also as direct evi-
dence against the crimes charged. 3 Admitting the tainted evidence would
essentially support the prosecution's case in chief and leave the exclusionary
rule devoid of purpose.84
Although lower courts consistently applied the Walder exception, 5 the
Supreme Court's enthusiasm for the exclusionary rule increased in the
1960's, causing speculation about the impeachment exception's vitality.
8 6
Maine Version of the Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 37 ME. L. REV. 383,
408 n. 112 (1985) (discussing distinction between collateral and direct evidence in relation to
impeachment exception).
81. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 178; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 74,
§ 9.6; see also Comment, supra note 74, at 941-43 (recognizing Walder exception as limited to
collateral matters); Note, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L.
REv. 912, 920 (1968) (collateral restriction based in Walder's holding).
82. See Walder, 347 U.S. at 64.
83. See Recent Decisions, 42 GEO. L.J. 542, 565 (1954) ("defendant is probably partially
convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence [despite the fact that it was only] used to
impeach him").
84. See Note, supra note 80, at 408 n. 112. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485
(1976) (citing Walder) ("the interest in promoting judicial integrity does not... require that
the trial court exclude [unlawfully obtained] evidence from use for impeachment of a defend-
ant, even though its introduction is certain to result in conviction in some cases").
85. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 910 (2d Cir. 1965) (trial court properly
relied on Walder in admitting suppressed statements used to impeach defendant), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 873 (1966); Jackson v. United States, 311 F.2d 686, 689 (5th Cir.) (impeachment of
defendant at trial with his excluded statements was justified under Waider), cert. denied 374
U.S. 850 (1963); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (based on
Walder, statements obtained from defendant during period of unlawful detention were admis-
sible to impeach defendant's contradictory testimony at trial); Ferrari v. United States, 244
F.2d 132, 140-41 (9th Cir.) (impeachment of defendant at trial with inadmissible testimony
was proper under Walder), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957).
86. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court pronounced its well known
protection of a defendant's fifth amendment right prohibiting the use of evidence obtained
during an interrogation of the defendant unless the government followed certain procedures
prior to the interrogation. Under these pre-interrogation procedures, law enforcement officials
must advise a suspected criminal: 1) of the right to remain silent; 2) that any statement made
may be used against the suspect as evidence in a criminal proceeding; and 3) of the right to
have an attorney, either retained or appointed, present during questioning. Id. at 444, 478-79.
Although Miranda involved the suppression at trial of incriminating statements and not the
impeachment exception, the Court stated that the fifth amendment protects a defendant from
self-incrimination in any manner, and recognized that exculpatory statements made by defend-
ants are often used to impeach their testimony at trial. Id. at 476. The Court reasoned that
these statements are "incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used
without the full warnings and effective [fifth amendment] waiver required for any other state-
ment." Id. at 477. Therefore, although the Court created an impeachment exception for un-
lawfully seized physical evidence, Miranda seemed to suggest that no such exception would
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C Molding the Exception-Will the Exception Swallow the Rule?
1. Harris v. New York: The Abandonment of Walder's Collateral
Requirement
In Harris v. New York, 87 the Court revived the impeachment exception
and applied it to evidence obtained in violation of the fifth amendment."8
Harris redefined the Walder limitations and dismissed language in a prior
case that called into question the exception's vitality. 9 In Harris, Harris
was arrested after selling heroin to an undercover police officer," and he
subsequently made incriminating statements without being informed of his
Miranda rights.9 ' At trial, the prosecution conceded the inadmissibility of
the statements in its case in chief. After Harris took the stand in his own
defense and denied the distribution charge on direct examination,9 2 however,
the trial court permitted the prosecutor to read the suppressed statements on
cross-examination to contradict Harris' direct testimony.93 Harris was con-
victed and the Supreme Court affirmed.94
In a relatively brief opinion,9 5 the Court began by dispelling prior case
language that made negative reference to the impeachment exception96 as
dictum.97 In reaffirming the validity of the impeachment exception, the
Court reiterated the prohibition against using the exclusionary rule as a
shield.98 Furthermore, the Court declined to adopt the presumed limitations
of Walder.9 9 Specifically, the Court recognized that while the issue im-
peached in Walder was collateral to the chief issue at trial, "00 the impeached
apply to fifth amendment violations. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 178; Comment,
supra note 74, at 947-49 (after Miranda, extension of the impeachment exception to pretrial
statements is not "tenable").
87. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
88. Id. at 223-24.
89. See id. at 224; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 178; supra note 86.
90. Harris, 401 U.S. at 222-23.
91. Id. at 223-24. The Court did not elaborate on the content of the statements. See id.
92. Id. at 223.
93. Id
94. Id. at 226.
95. The majority's opinion consisted of approximately four pages. For criticism of this
brevity, see Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 73, at 1198-99 (Harris Court hastily decided broad
questions of constitutional law without clarity and offered little guidance to lower courts).
96. See supra note 86.
97. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 224-25. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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testimony in Harris related more directly to the crimes charged." 1 The
Court noted that Harris' trial testimony sharply contradicted his earlier
statements. Although the earlier statements were obtained unlawfully, the
Court concluded that failure to allow impeachment essentially would con-
done the defendant's attempt to manipulate the judicial system."°l Once
again, the Court prevented a defendant from using the exclusionary rule as a
shield.
In supporting its expansion of Walder, the Court focused on the benefit of
impeachment to the trial's truth-seeking objective, determining that it was
valuable in aiding the jury's assessment of the defendant's credibility." 3
Although recognizing the exclusionary rule's attempt at preventing police
misconduct, the Court justified the impeachment exception by referring to
the potential for police misconduct as only a "speculative possibility."'"
The Court reasoned that the current prohibition of the evidence in the prose-
cution's case in chief sufficiently deters police misconduct.10 5  By aban-
doning the presumed collateral evidence requirement of Walder,'° the
Court thus further expanded the use of the impeachment exception. 0 7 And
while Walder and Harris indicated that the impeachment exception applied
only to the direct examination of defendants, the Court later continued its
expansion of the impeachment exception by applying it to cross-examination
in United States v. Havens 08
2. United States v. Havens: Expansion of the Exception to Cross-
Examination
In United States v. Havens,"° airport customs officials unlawfully
searched Havens' luggage and seized a T-shirt implicating him in a narcotics
smuggling operation. 10 The T-shirt was suppressed at trial based on the
101. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. The Court did not explain, however, how Harris' statements
were directly related. Id. See Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 73, at 1214 (criticizing the Harris
Court's representation of the trial record).




106. Id. See supra note 74-84 and accompanying text.
107. With Harris, the Court extended the impeachment exception to include coverage of
the fifth amendment's exclusionary rule. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974).
For criticism of the Court's reasoning in Harris, see supra notes 13, 95, 101.
108. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 622-23. Havens' co-defendant was searched by a customs officer who found
cocaine sewn into pockets created from pieces of another T-shirt. Id. After searching Havens'
luggage, the customs officer found a T-shirt with cut holes matching the makeshift patches.
Id. at 622.
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fourth amendment's exclusionary rule."' On direct examination, Havens
denied involvement in the smuggling scheme, but made no reference to the
T-shirt. 2 On cross-examination, the prosecution questioned Havens as to
whether he possessed the T-shirt when going through customs and whether
the T-shirt was seized from his luggage." 3 He denied both possession and
knowledge of the seizure." 4 The trial court allowed the prosecution to in-
troduce the T-shirt into evidence and instructed the jury to consider it solely
for impeachment purposes."' Havens was convicted and the Supreme
Court, finding the government's impeachment proper, affirmed the
conviction.' 16
In expanding the impeachment exception to cross-examination, the
Havens Court focused heavily on the truth-seeking value of the exception.17
The Court applied the exception to cross-examination testimony because the
prosecution's questioning was reasonably based on Havens' direct examina-
tion testimony."" During cross-examination, Havens provided false state-
ments closely related to his direct examination testimony. The Court thus
reasoned that Havens "opened the door" for the prosecutor to challenge him
with the otherwise suppressed evidence." 9 The Court distinguished Agnello
v. United States, 2 0 in which impeachment was held improper when the ex-
cluded evidence was raised on cross-examination. 2 ' The Havens Court
found the cross-examination in Agnello "too tenuous" to any subject raised
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 623.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 629. The Court held that "a defendant's statements made in response to proper
cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are subject to
otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally
obtained." Id. at 627-28.
117. Id. at 626-27. In Havens, the Court adopted the truth-seeking goal articulated in
Harris as a basis for the impeachment exception. In Harris, the Court stated that "[having
voluntarily taken the stand, [the defendant] was under an obligation to speak truthfully and
accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing de-
vices of the adversary process." 401 U.S. at 225. Subsequent decisions have relied on the
Harris Court's reasoning in support of the truth-seeking goal. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 173 (1986) ("Harris... make[s] it crystal clear that there is no right whatever-constitu-
tional or otherwise-for a defendant to use false evidence."); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 237-38 (1980) (citing Harris); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (the Court is
"always engaged in a search for truth"); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 178 (discuss-
ing truth-seeking function of the impeachment exception).
118. Havens, 446 U.S. at 628.
119. IM
120. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
121. Id. at 35. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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on direct examination to allow impeachment 22 and held that because al-
lowing the prosecutor to cross-examine effectively is an essential element of
the adversarial system's goal of attaining the truth, 2 ' a defendant must tes-
tify truthfully or "suffer the consequences."' 24 Accordingly, Havens further
extended the opportunity for use of unlawfully obtained evidence at trial.' 2
122. 446 U.S. at 625. On this point, the Court followed Walder, which also implied that
Agnello's cross-examination was too far removed from the issues raised on direct to open the
door for impeachment. Id. See Note, The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 12, at 234 (discussing
distinctions between Agnello and Walder); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Con-
stitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 1476, 1479 (1973).
123. Havens, 446 U.S. at 626-27.
124. Id. at 626. The Court also reaffirmed its holding in Harris, which stated that the issue
of whether the matter sought to be impeached was collateral was no longer a necessary deter-
mination in applying the impeachment exception. Id. at 624-25.
Havens drew sharp criticism for expanding the impeachment exception to cross-examina-
tion. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("hop[ing] that (after Havens] the Court [will] not be prepared to acquiesce in torture or other
police conduct that 'shocks the conscience' even if it demonstrably advance[s] the factfinding
process"); see also Note, The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 12, at 236-41 (Havens overempha-
sized the truth-seeking rationale and disregarded the exclusionary rule's deterrence goal);
Note, Impeachment By Illegally Obtained Evidence, supra note 12, at 671 (after Havens, "de-
fendant no longer may be free to make a meaningful denial of the elements of the crime
charged").
125. While use of the impeachment exception expanded at the federal level, its use in state
courts varied. For some states applying the exception, see Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 687
(Del. 1983) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible for impeachment of
defendant); State v. Retherford, 270 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1972) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
953 (1973); Manbeck v. State, 165 Ga. App. 625, 627, 302 S.E.2d 361, 364 (1983) (same); State
v. McCarty, 421 So. 2d 213, 215 (La. 1982) (same); State v. Durepo, 472 A.2d 919, 924 (Me.
1984) (same); People v. Maerling, 64 N.Y.2d 134, 140, 474 N.E.2d 231, 233, 485 N.Y.S.2d 23,
25 (1984) (same); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 353, 534 A.2d 198, 203 (1987) (suppressed
evidence unavailable to prosecution for impeachment use except where demonstrated that de-
fendant clearly contradicted suppressed evidence on direct examination).
For some states refusing to apply the exception, see State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 265-
66, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971) (Hawaii Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination pre-
cludes use of unlawfully obtained statements for impeachment of defendant); People v. Mason,
22 Mich. App. 595, 614, 178 N.W.2d 181, 191 (1970) (refusing to recognize Walder as binding
authority and holding impeachment of defendant with tainted evidence to be improper); Rob-
bins v. State, 696 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (prosecution may not use illegally
obtained evidence for impeachment of defendant).
State courts vary in their application of the impeachment exception due to the Supreme
Court's unwillingness to discourage heightened evidentiary safeguards. As the Court stated in
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal
constitutional standards." Id. at 719 (emphasis in original) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw.
361, 368-69, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (1974)). The Court continued, however, that "a State may not
impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court spe-
cifically refrains from imposing them." Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (emphasis in original) (citing
Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966);
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Although the exclusionary rule initially barred the use of all unlawfully
obtained evidence in criminal proceedings, the impeachment exception
emerged to preclude unfair use of the rule.'26 Because of its limited applica-
tion to impeachment, the exception enhanced the ability of prosecutors to
further the truth-seeking goal of the judicial system without undermining
the exclusionary rule's attempted deterrence of police misconduct.' 27
Although the impeachment exception presumably had certain boundaries,'128
subsequent decisions removed these by expanding use of the exception to
both direct and collateral evidence elicited on both direct and cross-examina-
tion. 129 In James v. Illinois, 130 the Court faced another opportunity to ex-
pand the exception by broadening its application to defense witnesses.131
II. JAMES . ILLINOI" DISALLOWING EXPANSION TO DEFENSE
WITNESSES
A. The Majority
Although the Supreme Court consistently expanded the impeachment ex-
ception after Walder, 132 the Court in James v. Illinois 13 3 refused to extend
the exception to defense witnesses.134 Justice Brennan, writing for the ma-
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 193 (8th Cir. 1965)). Given these guidelines,
while state courts are not strictly bound by the Court's application of the impeachment excep-
tion, they must have independent state grounds as basis for their departure. See Annotation,
Propriety of Using Otherwise Inadmissible Statement, Taken in Violation of Miranda Rule, to
Impeach Criminal Defendant's Credibility - State Cases, 14 A.L.R. 4th 676 (1982); see also
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972) (states may adopt higher proof standards ac-
cording to their own constitutions); State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982) (federal
court decisions represent constitutional minimum).
126. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 87-102, 109-25 and accompanying text.
130. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
131. At least three state courts have addressed expansion of the impeachment exception to
defense witnesses. In Hendrickson v. State, 290 Ark. 319, 719 S.W.2d 420 (1986), while it did
not reach the issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that the "prosecutor...
would have been entitled to use the [defendant's suppressed] statements and testimony to im-
peach [a defense] witness." Ida at 326, 719 S.W.2d at 424. In State v. Burnett, 637 S.W.2d 680
(Mo. 1982), however, the Missouri Supreme Court held that suppressed evidence was not ad-
missible to impeach a defense witness. Id. at 690. Likewise, in People v. Walls, 42 A.D.2d
575, 344 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, held that a defendant's statements, while not offered by the prosecution at a pre-trial
hearing because of a Miranda deficiency, were inadmissible to impeach a defense witness. Id.
at 576, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 436-37.
132. See supra notes 87-125 and accompanying text.
133. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
134. Id at 309.
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jority, began the analysis by recognizing that arriving at the truth is the
fundamental goal of America's legal process. 1 35 The Court noted that this
truth-seeking goal may be overcome, however, by the fact that the Constitu-
tion does insulate the accused criminal from the illegal actions of law en-
forcement officials.136 Justice Brennan acknowledged the historical
progression of the impeachment exception from Walder to Havens as a bal-
ance between truth-seeking and deterring police misconduct, and refused to
expand coverage to defense witnesses because such an expansion would not
further these two purposes.137 In its opinion, the majority first analyzed
whether expansion of the exception would further the truth-seeking function
of the trial.' 38 The Court then looked at whether the exclusionary rule




Addressing the truth-seeking rationale behind the impeachment excep-
tion, Justice Brennan noted that the existing exception provides defendants
the opportunity to testify freely and truthfully, but does not prevent the in-
troduction of evidence that contradicts the defendant's testimony.'" The
Court reasoned that "[t]he exception thus generally discourages perjured tes-
timony without discouraging truthful testimony."14 In contrast, Justice
Brennan suggested that expanding the exception to include the testimony of
all defense witnesses would not have the same effect.
142
First, the Court rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's premise that expan-
sion of the exception is needed to deter "'perjury by proxy.' ,43 Justice
Brennan held that the threat of criminal prosecution for perjury is a suffi-
cient deterrent against defense witnesses providing false testimony.'" Refer-
135. Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980)).
136. Id (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987)).
137. Id at 311-20.
138. Id at 313-17.
139. Id at 317-19.
140. Id at 314.
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id The Illinois Supreme Court maintained that the "animating principle" behind the
Court's impeachment exception cases was the balancing of the exclusionary rule's goals with
the ability to arrive at the truth through use of the exception. People v. James, 123 111. 2d 523,
536, 528 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1988), rev'd 493 U.S. 307 (1990). Given this mandate, the Illinois
Supreme Court reasoned that "if a defendant is prohibited from using perjury by way of a
defense, it matters not from whose lips that perjury comes." Id
144. 493 U.S. at 314. But see Shellenberger, Perjury Prosecutions After Acquittalk The
Evils of False Testimony Balanced Against the Sanctity of Determinations of Innocence, 71
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ring to the " 'perjury by proxy'" premise as "suspect," Justice Brennan
noted the dissent's concession 45 that "'false testimony can result from
faulty recollection' as opposed to intentional lying."'" Thus "'perjury by
proxy' " was not of great concern to the majority.' 47
Next, the Court predicted that applying the exception to all defense wit-
nesses would "chill" the defendant's case.' 48 Justice Brennan first explained
that "'friendly' " witnesses, due to either insufficient care or inadequate
preparation, often cannot be" 'trusted' " to testify without giving statements
"in sufficient tension" with the suppressed evidence.' 49 A court might view
such tension as contrary to the suppressed evidence and allow the prosecu-
tion to introduce the evidence to impeach such witnesses.'5 ° According to
Justice Brennan, defendants would likely choose not to call witnesses rather
than run the risk of "opening the door" to the admission of suppressed evi-
dence based on a" 'friendly'" witness' testimony.' He noted that" 'reluc-
tant'" or "'hostile'" witnesses called by a defendant might not share the
defendant's concern about introducing contradictory evidence and could
make statements triggering the impeachment exception."5 2 Again, Justice
Brennan claimed that because "a party 'cannot be absolutely certain that his
witnesses will testify as expected,' ,13 expansion of the impeachment excep-
tion would inhibit a defendant's ability to call witnesses who could offer pro-
bative evidence."'
MARQ. L. REV. 703, 708-09 (1988) (perjury prosecutions are rare and perjury sanction is not
an effective deterrent).
145. See James. 493 U.S. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 314 n.4 (quoting id at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
147. See id. at 314-16 & n.4.
148. Id at 314-16.




153. Id (quoting Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 609 (1972)).
154. Id. at 315-16. The Court maintained that the potential "chill" such an expansion
would create outweighed the gains to the truth-seeking process. Id at 314-17. The Court
continued that under an expansion of the impeachment exception, regardless of a witness'
motive, the impeachment exception could be used when witnesses make statements merely in
"tension," rather than in direct conflict, with the suppressed evidence. The Court held that
mere tension would result in the use of excluded evidence becoming unbridled. Id at 315-16.
Justice Kennedy's application of the exception, however, would require more than mere ten-
sion, thereby avoiding unbridled use of the excluded evidence. See infra note 173 and accom-
panying text.
The Illinois Supreme Court proposed that the expansion of the impeachment exception
could be limited to statements that are "purposely presented by the defendant." People v.
James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 537, 528 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1988), rev'd. 493 U.S. 307 (1990). Because
the trial court failed to determine whether the testimony of the defense witness in James was
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The majority concluded this issue by noting that while defendants should
not be allowed to pervert the exclusionary rule and shield their perjury, the
state should not be allowed to wield the excluded evidence as a sword and
hinder defendants' presentation of witnesses."' 5 The majority next turned to
the issue of whether expansion of the impeachment exception would weaken
the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct.
2. Police Misconduct: Stacking the Deck
The Court also determined that expanding the impeachment exception
would erode the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to police misconduct.15 6
Although recognizing the Court's previous characterization of police mis-
conduct as only a "'speculative possibility'" under the existing impeach-
ment exception,'5 7 Justice Brennan concluded that because defense
witnesses outnumber testifying defendants, an expansion of the impeach-
ment exception to include all defense witnesses would necessarily increase
the opportunity to use tainted evidence and thereby raise police misconduct
beyond a speculative possibility.'5 8 Justice Brennan claimed that under the
expanded version of the exception law enforcement officials "would recog-
nize that obtaining evidence through illegal means stacks the deck heavily in
the prosecution's favor"' 5 9 and that misconduct would necessarily increase
as a result.' 6°
The majority rejected the argument that, regardless of the additional op-
portunities for use of the excluded evidence via impeachment, the unavaila-
purposely presented, and because this proposed test could be too subjective, the Court rejected
this suggestion. 493 U.S. at 316 n.6. The Illinois Supreme Court further proposed that expan-
sion be limited to statements elicited from defense witnesses on direct examination. People v.
James, 123 Ill. 2d at 538, 528 N.E.2d at 730. Because of the holding in United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), that eliminated the distinction between testimony elicited on
direct versus cross-examination when employing the impeachment exception, the majority also
rejected this suggestion. 493 U.S. at 316 n.6. Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court proposed
limiting expansion of the exception to testimony in direct conflict with the suppressed evi-
dence, with conflict determinations made through a judicial inquiry. People v. James, 123 Inl.
2d at 538, 528 N.E.2d at 730. The majority rejected this suggestion, arguing that the result of
such inquiry could be unpredictable. 493 U.S. at 316 n.6. In response to the supposed unpre-
dictable nature of such hearings, however, the dissent recognized that such inquiries are "com-
monplace" in evidentiary matters. Id. at 325 n. 1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra text
accompanying note 175.
155. James, 493 U.S. at 317.
156. Id
157. Id. (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)). See supra text accompa-
nying note 104.
158. Id at 318.
159. Id
160. Id.
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bility of the evidence from the prosecutor's case in chief still provides a
"quantum of deterrence" for police misconduct. 161 In doing so, the Court
reasoned that police misconduct occurs in relation to a police officer's assess-
ment of a prosecutor's prima facie case.162 In situations where the officer
believes that illegally obtained evidence might hamper the efforts of estab-
lishing a prima facie case, misconduct is deterred for "fear of jeopardizing
the entire case."' 163 The Court noted, however, that law enforcement offi-
cials typically know when they have sufficient, legally obtained evidence to
establish a prima facie case, and they would have "little to lose and much to
gain by overstepping constitutional limits on evidence gathering" to secure
evidence for impeachment purposes.'6 Thus, according to Justice Brennan,
the suggested "quantum of deterrence" has a limited effect on
misconduct.16
5
The Court concluded that the impeachment exception's expansion to in-
clude defense witnesses would not significantly further the truth-seeking ob-
jective, but rather would "appreciably undermine" the exclusionary rule's
deterrent effect.' 66 Based on this reasoning, the Court refused to expand the
impeachment exception. 1
67
B. The Dissent: A Practical Solution Versus
the Majority's "Wooden Rule"
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy stated that the majority's "exaggerated
view [of expansion] leads to a drastic remedy: The jury cannot learn that
defense testimony is inconsistent with probative evidence of undoubted
value."' 68 Although agreeing with the majority that expansion of the im-
peachment exception requires consideration of its truth-seeking value
161. Id.
162. Id at 318-19.
163. Id at 319.
164. Id
165. Justice Brennan suggested that the police officers in James already knew of several
eyewitnesses to the shooting, and likely believed that these witnesses would sufficiently estab-
lish a prima facie case. Id at 319 n.8. Nevertheless, the officers elicited the statement in spite
of this fact, demonstrating that exclusion of the evidence to the prosecutor's case in chief, as
suggested by the United States (as amicus curiae), would have little deterrent effect. Id But
see id. at 329 n.3 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("contrary to the impression conveyed by the ma-
jority, the arresting officers knew almost nothing of the state of a future prosecution case"
(citation omitted)). The Court also held that in addressing exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
focus must be placed on the "systemic effects" such exceptions have on individual liberty vis a
vis "arbitrary or oppressive police conduct." Id at 319-20.
166. Id at 320.
167. Id
168. Id at 322 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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weighed against the likelihood of deterring police misconduct, Justice Ken-
nedy argued that "the exclusionary rule does not apply where the interest in
pursuing truth ... outweighs any deterrence of unlawful [police] conduct
that the rule might achieve."' 69 The dissent claimed that the majority's
opinion grants the defendant "broad immunity" to introduce false testi-
mony. 7° Accordingly, Justice Kennedy stated that the refusal to expand
the impeachment exception will result in misleading jurors with false testi-
mony, thereby harming the truth-seeking function of the trial.'71
Justice Kennedy rejected the majority's prediction that expansion of the
impeachment exception would "chill" a defendant's ability to present wit-
nesses as far too speculative to justify the majority's holding."7 2 He con-
ceded that if testimony in mere tension with the suppressed evidence could
trigger the impeachment exception, the majority's concern would be more
credible.' 73 Recognizing this weakness, the dissent offered a limit on com-
169. Id (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 (1976); United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974)).
170. Id
171. Id at 324-25. The dissent maintained that failure to allow expansion would also leave
jurors skeptical of the prosecution's case due to the inability to challenge such testimony. Id
Justice Kennedy illustrated:
To deprive the jurors of knowledge that statements of the defendant himself revealed
the witness' testimony to be false would result in a decision by triers of fact who were
not just kept in the dark as to excluded evidence, but positively misled. The potential
for harm to the truth-seeking process... will be greater than if the defendant himself
had testified. It is natural for jurors to be skeptical of self-serving testimony by the
defendant. Testimony by a witness said to be independent has the greater potential
to deceive. And if a defense witness can present false testimony with impunity, the
jurors may find the rest of the prosecution's case suspect, for ineffective and artificial
cross-examination will be viewed as a real weakness in the State's case. Jurors will
assume that if the prosecution had any proof the statement was false, it would make
the proof known. The majority does more than deprive the prosecution of evidence.
The State must also suffer the introduction of false testimony and appear to bolster
the falsehood by its own silence.
Id
172. Id. at 325.
173. Id. To exemplify that mere tension does not routinely trigger the impeachment excep-
tion, however, Justice Kennedy cited the James trial court's refusal to introduce excluded
evidence on this basis. Id. at 325 n. 1. He pointed out that:
There is no suggestion that the trial court considered witness Jewel Henderson's tes-
timony about petitioner's hair color to be a basis for admitting petitioner's other
statements about the shootings. Henderson also testified that she was with petitioner
at his home on the night of the shooting, and that petitioner had arrived there be-
tween 10 and 11 p.m., but that she could not be specific about the time. The State
sought to rebut this testimony with petitioner's suppressed statements about the
shooting, contending that Henderson's testimony established an alibi for the shoot-
ing, which occurred around 11:00. The court concluded that no alibi was estab-
lished, and refused to allow introduction of the suppressed statements on rebuttal.
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plete expansion of the exception by suggesting that the evidence should only
be admitted when in direct conflict with the testimony, leaving the jury to
decide.' 74 Justice Kennedy maintained that the separate hearings routinely
conducted by trial judges to determine the admissibility of evidence could be
employed to resolve issues of direct conflict, thus identifying inconsistencies
and defining the proper application of impeachment.' 7 5 Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that adoption of this alternative would preserve the truth-seeking func-
tion of the trial for the jury and satisfy fourth amendment concerns through
exclusion of the evidence from the prosecutor's case in chief, both consistent
with previous Court holdings regarding the impeachment exception. 1
76
The dissent then criticized the majority's failure to acknowledge the "al-
most certain [conclusion] that the testimony immunized from rebuttal is
false." 177 Justice Kennedy characterized "[tihe majority's apparent assump-
tion that defense witnesses protected by [the Court's holding] have only
truth-telling in mind.., as far too sanguine to support acceptance of a rule
that controls the hard reality of contested criminal trials."'17 1 Justice Ken-
nedy continued that the "majority's ironclad rule is one that applies regard-
less of the witness' motives, and may be misused as a license to perjure.
Even if the witness testifies in good faith, the defendant and his lawyer, who
offer the testimony, know the facts."' 179  Because the defendant, through
counsel, controls the questioning on direct examination, Justice Kennedy
determined that the defendant could avoid admission of the excluded evi-
dence by simply not calling a witness whose testimony contradicts the sup-
pressed evidence.'8 °
d
174. Id. at 325 (stating that the impeachment exception should apply "where, within rea-
son, the witness' testimony and the excluded testimony cannot both be true").
175. Id. at 325 & n.l.
176. Id. at 329-30, 352.
177. Id. at 326.
178. Id. The majority's assumption could be credible, but for the fact that it overlooks
thirty years of impeachment exception cases dealing with defendants' attempts to pervert the
judicial system through their lies. These cases represent a committed stand against such per-
version. See supra notes 65-125 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 326.
180. Id. at 328. The dissent pointed out that the defense attorney in James expected the
witness to cast doubt on the validity of the eyewitness identifications of a red-haired shooter by
eliciting testimony contrary to the defendant's own statements, id. at 326, and that failure to
allow impeachment would stand squarely against the truth-seeking goal. Furthermore, by rec-
ognizing this tactic as the obvious motivation for calling the witness, the failure to allow im-
peachment adds merit to the perjury "by proxy" argument. The defendant has created a solid
assurance of avoiding the excluded evidence, and in doing so, perverted the judicial system by
purposefully casting doubt on the other, reliable evidence.
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Next, Justice Kennedy dismissed the majority's reliance on the threat of
prosecution as a deterrent against perjury for two reasons.' First, because
of the heightened proof requirements in prosecuting a perjury charge, per-
jury convictions are difficult to sustain. 8 2 Second, Justice Kennedy noted
that when the testimony is elicited from a friend or family member to benefit
a defendant, threats of future perjury prosecutions are "idle." ' 3 Therefore,
the dissent determined that reliance on this threat to reject expansion of the
impeachment exception was hollow.' 84
Addressing the majority's claims about the increase of police misconduct,
the dissent flatly disagreed with the majority's notion that police officers reg-
ularly confront and succumb to the temptation to gather illegally evidence to
bolster the prosecution's case.'8 5 The dissent characterized the majority's
vision of calculating police officers as "unrealistic" and inconsistent with the
conclusions reached in earlier cases involving the impeachment exception. '
8 6
The dissent stressed that police officers are "unschooled in the law," and the
Court has no reason to believe that police officers make assessments as to the
legality of evidence already obtained by them and whether such evidence
will survive evidentiary hearings.'87 The dissent then reiterated the Court's
previous holding from Harris v. New York 188 where it found that even
" '[a]ssuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed
police conduct,'" such deterrence is present when the suppressed evidence is
unavailable during the prosecution's case in chief.'8 9 Accordingly, Justice
Kennedy concluded that expansion of the impeachment exception would
181. Id. at 326-27.
182. Id. (citing Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 108 (1979); People v. Alkire, 321 Ill.
28, 151 N.E. 518 (1926); People v. Harrod, 140 I1. App. 3d 96, 488 N.E.2d 316 (1986)); see
Shellenberger, supra note 144.
183. 493 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the majority's concern that the state could obtain
unbridled power to utilize suppressed evidence under the expansion might be justified if the
testimony involved was elicited on cross-examination. Id. at 328. While the majority refused
to consider this claim based on the Court's holding in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620
(1980), Justice Kennedy suggested that perhaps a modified rule could be adopted for witnesses
other than the defendant. 493 U.S. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out
that "[r]ather than wait for an appropriate case to consider this or similar measures, however,
the majority opts for a wooden rule immunizing all defense testimony from rebuttal." Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
187. Id. at 329.
188. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
189. 493 U.S. at 329-30 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225). Jus-
tice Kennedy also recognized that, by introducing James' statements that he dyed his hair to
'" 'change his appearance,'" the prosecution did go beyond what was necessary to rebut the
witness' testimony about James' hair color. Id Nevertheless, the dissent emphasized that any
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prevent the perversion sought to be avoided through the existing exception
and classified the perversion in James, albeit by proxy, as no different from
that in previous cases.
190
C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence: Threat of Perjury Prosecution is a
"Hard Reality"
Justice Stevens, while joining the majority, submitted a concurring opin-
ion in response to certain issues raised by the dissent.'" Justice Stevens
criticized the dissent for mischaracterizing the issue actually before the
Court in James. 192 According to Justice Stevens, the question facing the
Court was not whether to uphold the interest of protecting the truth-seeking
function of the trial, as this is an interest conceded to be "self-evident."'
' 93
Rather, Justice Stevens determined that the issue was whether admission of
the illegally obtained evidence would "sufficiently advance the truth-seeking
function to overcome the loss to the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule." 94 Without elaborating on his particular assessment of the issues
before the Court, Justice Stevens simply stated that the dissent presented an
exaggerated view of the damage the majority's holding would have on the
truth-seeking function. 95 Justice Stevens also criticized the dissent's brief
dismissal of the threat of prosecution as a deterrent effect for perjury "by
proxy."' 96 He acknowledged that even though a defendant may want to
overstate his case with witnesses, the dissent ignored the "'hard reality' ,,97
that witnesses "will think long and hard before accepting a defendant's invi-
tation to knowingly offer false testimony. ' '
error which may have been committed by the trial court was harmless, given the testimony of
the five eyewitnesses. Md.
190. Id.





196. Id at 321.
197. Id. (quoting id. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
198. Id. Justice Stevens also questioned whether the police detective's testimony about
James' statements should be given "100 percent credence," for it is only then "that the dissent
can so categorically state that 'the defendant himself revealed the witness' testimony to be
false.'" Id. (quoting id. at 324 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). This criticism was apparently in-
tended to deflate the dissent's view that the majority's decision undermines the truth-seeking
process. See Id. at 324-28. Finally, addressing the dissent's conclusion that any error commit-
ted by the trial court was harmless, Justice Stevens questioned whether the impeachment of the
defense witness in James was even necessary, given the testimony of the five eyewitnesses. 493
U.S. at 321-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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III. THE EXCEPTION'S VITALrrY: THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
When applying the impeachment exception, courts must balance the
truth-seeking goal of the trial against the possible encouragement of police
misconduct caused by admitting tainted evidence. 99 If the truth-seeking
process can benefit through the admission of tainted evidence, with minimal
deterioration of the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect, 2" the proper balance
must be struck in favor of truth. Where, however, admitting tainted evi-
dence appears to encourage or further increase police misconduct and will
result in little or no benefit to the truth-seeking process, courts should ex-
clude the evidence. Justice Kennedy's proposed limit on expansion of the
impeachment exception strikes the proper balance.
In James, the Court refused to expand the impeachment exception to de-
fense witnesses because of its concern that expansion would do little to en-
hance the truth-seeking process and do much to weaken the deterrent goal of
the exclusionary rule.2"1 Expansion of the impeachment exception, how-
ever, likely would have just the opposite effect. By refusing to further ex-
pand the impeachment exception, the Court relied on the ability of
prosecutors to pursue perjury charges against lying witnesses.2"2 Rather
than permitting the prosecution to challenge falsehoods in the trial in which
they are entered, the Court allowed their presentation to the jury without
challenge.20 3 In refusing to expand the exception, the Court abandoned the
truth-seeking function of the trial.
199. See id. at 311-12 (majority opinion).
200. This is, of course, accepting the premise that the exclusionary rule has an actual deter-
rent effect. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
201. 493 U.S. at 320.
202. Id. at 314.
203. In opting for such a result, the Court failed to take into account two important consid-
erations. First, if a defense witness' testimony is false, albeit from faulty recollection, it is
nonetheless false. See id. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A successful perjury prosecution
cannot result from false testimony given by a witness who honestly believed the truthfulness of
the testimony. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1139 (6th ed. 1990) ("A person is guilty of
perjury if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under oath.., and he does not
believe it to be true."). Nevertheless, by refusing to allow impeachment, the Court apparently
endorses a jury's deliberation on falsehoods. In James, no one knew more clearly than the
defendant what color his hair was the night of the shooting. Disallowing the impeachment of
the witness' testimony stands in direct conflict with any search for the truth. In his concur-
rence, Justice Stevens attempted to deflect criticism of the majority's endorsement of the intro-
duction of false testimony by criticizing the dissent's "100 percent credence" in the police
officer's testimony. 493 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., concurring). But the majority gave equal
credence to the witness' testimony, however, and Justice Stevens' concurrence fell short of
deflecting the criticism.
Second, the majority's reliance on perjury prosecutions does nothing to remedy the
problems presented in the prosecution of a defendant such as Darryl James. If a defendant is
acquitted, the fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy precludes a second trial to
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Justice Brennan stated that a defendant's best defense often includes the
presentation of witnesses, 2o4 and the majority's holding was based signifi-
cantly on the claim that expanding the exception would eliminate the de-
fendant's ability to call witnesses. 2°5 The Court's concerns, however, are
misplaced. If the Court's previous focus in developing the impeachment ex-
ception was on enhancing truth and thwarting perversion of the judicial sys-
tem,2°6 any limitation on the presentation of witnesses should be weighed
against the resulting benefit of admitting the evidence in relation to the
truth-seeking function of the trial. That is, if a defendant decides not to call
a witness because he fears the witness may open the door to truthful but
suppressed evidence, then it is probable that the witness would not have told
the truth. The majority's concern for the ability of a defendant to call wit-
nesses replaced any sincere consideration of the positive effect that expansion
of the impeachment exception could have on arriving at the truth.20 7 There-
fore, while earlier Court cases cited truth-seeking as paramount, 208 the
James Court abandoned precedent and instead created a new goal to protect:
remedy an acquittal based on the perjurious testimony of a defense witness. See U.S. CONsT.
amend. V ("No person shall be... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb .... ). Therefore, the majority's decision favors the acquittal of a murderer over
the uncertain possibility of a perjurer's future conviction. See 493 U.S. at 313-20.
204. 493 U.S. at 314-15.
205. Id. The majority also justified its refusal to expand the impeachment exception based
on its prediction that unprepared or "'hostile' " witnesses may "open the door" to suppressed
evidence. Idl However, the prediction assumed that the testimony would be contradictory
and questionable, if not plainly false, and indicates both the majority's recognition that wit-
nesses would subjugate the truth by providing false testimony, either by perjury or faulty recol-
lection, and the majority's willingness to accept this result. See id. at 313-20. Where the
suppressed evidence is physical, no problem exists as to whether a witness' contradictory testi-
mony is false, as the evidence exists and the testimony either does or does not conflict with it.
When the suppressed evidence is a defendant's statement, however, the issue becomes the cred-
ibility of the defense witness testifying and of the law enforcement official who received the
statement. The jury should be the judge of this credibility, and the Court takes away that
function by disallowing expansion of the impeachment exception. Id. at 327 n.2.; see id. at 327
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("missing from the majority's analysis is the almost certain knowl-
edge that the testimony.., is false"). Under James, defendants are still free to testify them-
selves and mold their testimony around the suppressed evidence to avoid its admission.
Defendants may present witnesses, however, who can purposely contradict the suppressed evi-
dence without challenge from the prosecution. See id. at 324-25. With such an option, the
entire impeachment exception is lost, as there is nothing to prevent a defendant from curbing
his testimony along certain boundaries and then presenting a witness to offer falsehoods which,
under James, cannot be challenged by the prosecutor. Id. at 325.
206. See supra notes 65-125 and accompanying text.
207. Furthermore, the Court failed to offer any examples of how the truth would not be
reached by expanding the exception, choosing instead to mask this lack of support by citin
speculative damage to a defendant's ability to present witnesses. See 493 U.S. at 314-15.
208. See supra notes 73, 103, 123-24 and accompanying text.
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enhancement of a defendant's ability to call witnesses. 2' But any hindrance
on the ability to put forth a defense should rightly rest on defendants. If
they elect to contradict suppressed evidence through the testimony of their
witnesses, defendants should also run the risk of having their lies revealed.210
The impeachment exception was designed to prohibit defendants from
manipulating the judicial system. 21' Regardless of whether the manipula-
tion is exercised via agents of the defendant, it is manipulation nonetheless,
and the Court's previous stance against such perversion of the judicial sys-
tem should have dictated the James Court's adoption rather than its dismis-
sal of expansion. Furthermore, witnesses are sworn to tell the truth on the
witness stand, and if expansion of the impeachment exception would lead to
the limitation of the presentation of witnesses, this surely would not under-
mine the truth, but instead, foil attempts to conceal it. By disallowing ex-
pansion, the majority adeptly has provided defendants a manipulative
procedural tactic and effectively destroyed the impeachment exception,
while endorsing the concept of perjury "by proxy. "212
Although deterring police misconduct was a major rationale behind the
exclusionary rule's development and the majority's holding in James,2" 3 the
majority did little to explain how misconduct would increase under an ex-
panded impeachment exception. The Court merely speculated that, because
of the increased opportunity for use of the impeachment exception under an
expanded interpretation, misconduct would necessarily increase.214 But
concluding, as the James majority does, that misconduct increases in pro-
portion to the availability of the fruits of such misconduct 215 assumes de-
209. Because James presented the Court with the issue of whether to expand the impeach-
ment exception to defense witnesses, the Court's focus on the innovative protection of a de-
fendant's right to call witnesses is not surprising. Yet, that does not mean the Court should
have compromised the truth-seeking goal of the trial in the process. Instead, the Court's hold-
ing should have reflected consideration of the new protection in light of the truth-seeking goal.
210. The Court's acceptance of this risk would be consistent with the Havens Court's view
that defendants must "suffer the consequences" if offering false testimony. United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980). See Note, Impeachment By Illegally Obtained Evidence,
supra- note 12, at 669.
211. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
212. See 493 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For further criticism of the majority's
,_"chill" theory, see Note, The Pinocchio Defense Witness Impeachment Exception to the Exclu-
sionary Rule: Combatting a Defendant's Right to Use With Impunity the Perjurious Testimony
of Defense Witnesses, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 447-48 (1990).
213. See supra notes 52, 156-65 and accompanying text.
214. This "numbers" rationale, however, wrongly assumes that police misconduct is not a
reflection of an officer's integrity, or lack thereof, but rather results from careful review of
Supreme Court decisions by police officers so that their conduct is guided by the current "tem-
perature" of the Court. See Burger, supra note 52, at 11 (police officers have neither the time
nor inclination to digest judicial opinions and act thereupon).
215. 493 U.S. at 318.
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fendants routinely provide prosecutors with witnesses offering testimony
contrary to the excluded evidence. If so, endorsing the truth-seeking goal of
the judicial process should place the burden on defendants to present wit-
nesses offering truthful testimony, rather than reject the introduction of evi-
dence, although illegally obtained, to satisfy an overly broad, speculative fear
of scheming law enforcement officials. Justice Brennan's speculation was
not new, but until James it lacked the support of a majority.
2 16
By adopting a "direct conflict" approach, Justice Kennedy's proposed res-
olution would curb any procedural manipulation of the exclusionary rule.217
Only where testimony stands in direct conflict with the suppressed evidence
218 ucwould impeachment be proper. With such an approach, the majority's
prediction of a "chilling" effect 21 9 easily is dismissed. The direct conflict
approach involves a limited use of the exception which, while still allowing
the presentation of an adequate defense, would only ensure that such a de-
fense was truthful. Moreover, the requirement of a separate evidentiary
hearing to determine whether testimony was presented purposely and in di-
rect conflict with the suppressed evidence22 would remedy the majority's
speculation of unbridled prosecutorial power 22 ' and retain judicial integ-
rity.2 2 The dissent achieved the proper balance between the truth-seeking
goal of the impeachment exception and retention of the exclusionary rule as
a deterrent.
216. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
processes of [the] judicial system may not be fueled by the illegalities of government authori-
ties."); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("it is mon-
strous that courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer"). Justice Brennan's
position is not surprising given that his opposition to any dissolution of the exclusionary rule is
well established. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Justice Brennan stated: "[I]n
case after case, I have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the [ex-
clusionary] rule. It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is com-
plete." Id at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,
629 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 41 (1979) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 544 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see Note, supra note 80, at 384 n.4.
217. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
218. Id
219. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
220. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 325 n.l. (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
222. Justice Kennedy's analysis of the majority's holding shows that without impeachment
the jury is essentially forced to believe the witness, as the prosecutor's inability to challenge the
testimony effectively serves as an endorsement of its veracity. See 493 U.S. at 325 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule, which bars unlawfully obtained evidence from use
in a criminal proceeding, was developed to preserve the integrity of the judi-
cial system and deter police misconduct. The impeachment exception was
created to prevent defendants from perverting the judicial system. This ex-
ception ensures truth and enables prosecutors to confront defendants choos-
ing to contradict suppressed evidence. The exception applies to testimony
elicited on both direct and cross-examination, and applies to matters both
directly related and collateral to the crimes charged. The exception previ-
ously was applied to a defendants' testimony. In James v. Illinois, however,
the Court refused to expand the impeachment exception to the testimony of
defense witnesses.
By disallowing expansion of the impeachment exception to defense wit-
nesses, the James decision greatly weakened, if not destroyed, the existing
exception. The Court's speculation that the exclusionary rule will be frus-
trated by allowing unlawfully obtained testimony to flood the courts was
based on the assumption that defendants routinely rely on false and contra-
dictory testimony of their witnesses, as it is only then that the impeachment
exception can be used. Conversely, in rejecting expansion of the impeach-
ment exception, the majority's failure to consider the consequences of a wit-
ness whose false testimony is a result of faulty recollection placed the Court
in a position of supporting jury deliberations based on falsehoods.
While the exclusionary rule initially served as a stand against overzealous
law enforcement activity, the Court ultimately refined the rule through the
impeachment exception. With the impeachment exception, police miscon-
duct was still discouraged by the unavailability of suppressed evidence in the
prosecution's case in chief, but because certain truthful statements could be
admitted for impeachment, the truth-seeking goal of the judicial system was
enhanced. Failure to further expand the impeachment exception to defense
witnesses only sacrifices the integrity of the judicial system for the sake of
calculating defendants.
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